Follow us @CITOrg or @dihrie or this blog for current information on the new Smart City Actuator.
In the last post we looked at commercial accelerator/investment programs and presented a methodology and results allowing more or less direct comparison of outcomes for these programs. The original study was funded by the Federal Government however to look at how these commercial approaches compared to government innovation programs.
There are a number of well-known innovation activities across the Federal Government, including the Small Business Administration’s SBIR program (Small Business Innovation Research…check out CIT’s own Robert Brooke as an SBIR 2016 Tibbetts Award Winner!), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and its programs, In-Q-Tel which is the intelligence community program that uses commercial-style practices to encourage government-relevant innovation, and others in the various military services, national laboratories, contractor activities and elsewhere.
Access to data on success rates and outcomes is as fragmented in the government domain as it is in the commercial world, in some cases compounded by classified work or other policies specifically designed to limit information access. But as in the commercial world, the best-known and most successful Government programs are not shy about sharing their results. Special commendation goes to the SBIR program and In-Q-Tel, both of whose data sets have proven invaluable.
The SBIR program identifies three phases of development, with Phase I generally less than 6 months and $150,000, Phase II generally less than $1,000,000 and 2 years, and Phase III externally (non-SBIR) funded, providing a reasonable basis of comparison in our model. The SBIR program publishes good data on the percentage of proposals and the amounts awarded at each Phase, allowing for a robust analysis, although the Government Accountability Office (GAO) did find that the data are insufficient to determine DoD SBIR transition success from Phase II to Phase III. One additional twist is that the Navy instituted a program from 2000 to 2015 called the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to provide mentoring support to these early stage researchers, and that data is also available in at least one study looking at the period from 2005 to 2008.
DARPA was a bit of a surprise. When the GAO tried to assess the transition performance of DARPA projects they concluded that “inconsistencies in how the agency defines and assesses its transition outcomes preclude GAO from reliably reporting on transition performance across DARPA’s portfolio of 150 programs that were successfully completed between fiscal years 2010 and 2014.” Another study puts DARPA success rate at about 3-5 products to market per year over 40 years, which the authors characterize as “quite impressive.” Measuring transition success is clearly not a priority.
In-Q-Tel data were a bit harder to come by, but here we were able to use two sources: their published number on downstream funding leverage, and a calculated number based on external data about the size of the In-Q-Tel portfolio and additional published funding events. Thus we were able to calculate a performance number and compare it to the published number, again as a check on the validity of the model. All of these results are shown in the Figure. The In-Q-Tel (IQT) data show reasonable correlation between published and calculated numbers depending where IQT falls on the investment spectrum, and also shows that the best Government programs perform in line with the best of the commercial programs.
What about the rest? A couple things seem clear. First, there is much more emphasis on activity than on outcomes in the Government R&D space…how many programs are funded versus how many of those funded programs succeed in eventually deploying to users. Given the rapid rate of change in technology and the fact that our national strategic competitors are looking very hard for strategic advantage, it is certainly in the U.S. national interest to have a robust scientific community actively researching a large number of areas of interest. In this domain, activity rather than outcomes may in fact be the right metric. Some of the focus on activity is also driven by the Government budget cycle process, and certainly if outcomes are not reliably known for 4-7 years as in the commercial world, this is beyond the next election cycle for most elected officials.
But in that subset where transition to users is important, perhaps even a stated goal, the Government programs seem to struggle. The fact that GAO could not determine transition success rates for either SBIR Phase III or DARPA is one indicator. Plenty of literature speaks of the “Valley of Death” in the Government world, where inventions go to die before ever being deployed.
Among other issues, there are structural reasons for this. The “market” for Government transition is generally Programs of Record, those big, often billion-dollar programs. Those programs run on an entirely different set of principles than the Government R&D world, a set of principles where risk reduction rules the day and innovation may not even be welcome. So most Government R&D programs and national laboratories now have “technology transition” programs or offices, looking to commercialize all those great inventions that have been developed along the way, in some case with associated patents.
The standard model for these efforts has been to look at the outcomes of the early stage R&D process and license the intellectual property, or try and find an entrepreneur who will take it on, or encourage the inventor to become an entrepreneur. Two problems plague this approach: intellectual property transfers much more effectively via people than via paper; and, inventions created and prototyped without the market discipline of external investors and users determining value are almost always poorly optimized for the eventual market they hope to serve.
The programs that have done best at this are those that adopt the most “commercial-like” practices: listen to your customers and end users, get early feedback, understand the needs, understand the price points, worry about transition to market. When GAO looked at a set of DARPA case studies, they summarized it this way.
The good news is that the Smart Cities Actuator instills the commercial version of exactly this set of principles. While the Federal government can focus significant investment on technology development, it seems that the best Government programs are about as good as the best commercial programs. The difference is not the amount of money but the set of practices that make transition effective.
Next (Monday 3/20): How do we know the Actuator is Working? Part 3 – Corporate/University Programs